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MA J. SCHWARTZ
The Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), an institution that has been in
operation since shortly after it was established by the Gold Reserve Act of
January 31, 1934, was remarkably little known before January 1995, when the
U.S. Treasury loaned Mexico $20 billion from the ESF as part of a rescue
package. What made the loan notorious was that it did not require
Congressional authorization but could be made at the discretion of the
Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President. In February
1996, the Treasury Department announced that it was suspending payment of
interest on government securities in the ESF’S portfolio in order to create
additional borrowing power for the government under the debt ceiling that
Congress was refusing to raise. These actions brought
notice after it had remained so long in obscurity.
The fund began operations as of April 27, 1934,
the fund to public
financed by $2 billion
of the $2.8 billion paper profit that the government realized from
devaluation, that is, from raising the price of gold to $35 an ounce from
$20.67. This sum was deposited to its account with
States (Treasury AR 1935, Exhibit 40, p. 265). The
in gold and foreign exchange in order to stabilize
the Treasurer of the United
fund was authorized to deal
the exchange value of the
dollar, to invest any portion of the fund not currently required for
stabilization purposes in direct obligations of the United States, and to add
any earnings from sales and interest on its investments to the sum available4
for its use.1
Of the $2 billion set aside for ESF capital, only $200 million was made
available for its working fund. The $1.8 billion was shown in the gold asset
and liability statement of the Treasurer of the United States as gold credited
to the ESF, The residual $200 million was presumably initially deposited in a
special account at the New York Federal ReseNe Bank, but by June 1934 the ESF
had reduced the deposit by investing $38 million in U.S. Treasury bonds, $20
qillion in gold (the bulk held at the U.S. Assay Office), and $30 million in
silver.
The ESF was established at a time when the dollar was pegged to the
price of gold but not to the exchange value of other currencies. It was
expected to function in just such an international monetary system. The
expectation, however, proved false, and the ESF had to adapt to the changing
international monetary system over the six decades that followed,




of the ESF as set forth in the statute, in particular, the
that contributed to its obscurity. In section 2 I describe the
the ESF as defined in the statute and as the mission developed in
the unexpected circumstances in which it operated. I conclude the section with
a statistical profile of the ESF that reflects the missions it serves. In
section 3 I assess the influence of the ESF in a broader context than its role
in the 1995 Mexican bailout.
1. DESIGN OF THE ESF
The act creating the ESF excluded it from the congressional
appropriation process once its initial capitalization was in place. It was
intended to be self-financing, and was not required to seek annual5
congressional funding for its operations,z me self-financing arrangement
contributed to the secrecy of ESF actions, since the fund did not have to
justify its expenditures during annual appeals to Congress for appropriations.
The ESF has increased the $200 million working balance it started with in 1934
to $42 billion in June 1995.3 The statistical profile that I present at a
later point shows how the ESF achieved this increase,
The fund was conceived to operate in secrecy under the exclusive control
of the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, “whose
decisions shall be final and not subject to review by any other officer of the
United States” (PL 87-73, sec. 10(b)). The intention was to cloak foreign
exchange market intervention. However, the Secretary of the Treasury was
willing to reveal information on stabilization loans to favored countries that
the ESF negotiated -- loans that had no mandate in the statute yet essentially
created a foreign affairs role for the Treasury.
The secrecy promoted two objectives. One was to conceal from the public
and Congress the exchange rates at which foreign currencies were bought and
sold, particularly if they involved losses. A second objective was to permit
the Treasury, if it so desired, to conceal information about any other
operations the ESF might undertake,4 The
secrecy of its operations on the British
ESF in any event could base the
Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA),
formally initiated July 1, 1932, It was described as “an anonymous and secret
body whose actions are not open to continuous scrutiny and criticism” (Hall
1935, p. 81), The House of Commons did not know and could not be told what the
EEA was doing (Drummond 1981, p, 188). One feature of the model was not,
however, copied. To operate the EEA, Parliament appropriated 175 million
pounds in Treasury bills, an amount that in later years was sizably increased6
(Sayers 1976, II, p. 427, pp. 487-88).5
Suspicion of the purpose of the EEA was a motive for the establishment
of the ESF. U.S. officials believed that
pound, not to smooth fluctuations in its
(Drummond 1981, p. 195). Each fund would
intentions and actions were.
the EEA was used to depreciate the
exchange rates, its official purpose
have liked to know what the other’s
The secrecy in which both the ESF and the EEA were designed to operate
was subsequently modified. A 1977 amendment to the Gold Reserve Act (31U.S.C.5
5302(b)) provided that an ESF loan or credit to a foreign entity or government
for more than 6 months in any 12-month period required the President to give
Congress “a written statement that
the loan or credit for more than 6
unique or emergency circumstances require
months. “ A 1978 amendment (31 U.S.C.S 5302
(c)(1) provided for a monthly statement to the House and Senate Banking
Committees by the Treasury “on all agreements made or renewed, all
transactions occurring during the month, and all projected liabilities” of the
ESF.
No change has occurred in the status of the Secretary’s decisions as
final, and not subject to review. In testimony before the House Banking
Committee in 1990, however, a Treasury official indicated that the department
would be amenable to review by Congress of this “veil of the greatest secrecy”
(Mulford, Hearings 1990, p. 62).
The ESF’S administrative expenses have been subject to the budget
process since 1979. In addition, the ESF is audited annually, with the report
originally submitted to the President, not to Congress. Later, Section $5302
(c) provided that Congress should also receive reports on the ESF’S
operations ,7
The response of the Republican Congress to the President’s authorization
of the ESF grant of $20 billion in medium-term loans to Mexico in January 1995
less any outstanding short-term loans and securities guarantees was to pass
the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of April 5, 1995. It directed the
administration to provide a broad range of docments, some of them classified,
about the bailout, before Mexico could obtain more money from the ESF.
Although Congress has required the President to give it information
about ESF transactions, the constitutionality of the ESF has not been
challenged. The ESF in its original design as a creature of the Executive
Branch, inunune to legislative oversight, breaches the separation of powers. It
is hard to believe that a fund with similar powers would win legislative
approval currently. In 1934, of course, New Deal legislation by and large was
initiated by the administration, Congress rubber-stamping what was put before
it. Ordinary citizens have no standing to mount a challenge to the
constitutionality of the ESF, and sixty years after its creation, it is
unlikely to happen.
2. MISSION OF THE ESF
A. Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
The statute authorized the ESF to deal in golde and foreign exchange. To
a limited extent it was involved in such transactions during the 1930s, but it
was not until 1961 that it became active in the foreign exchange market. The
reason was that, except during its initial years, the international monetary
system in which the ESF existed did not conform to the expectations of the
de~igners of the agency.
The record of ESF foreign exchange market intervention thus falls into
two periods: the period before 1962, when little opportunity for intervention8
arose, and the period that followed, when the ESF enlisted the Federal Reserve
to join it in intervening in the foreign exchange market. I begin by
summarizing the few highlights of the first period.
Pre-1962 Intervention. The ESF dealt in foreign exchange only prior to World
War II. A statement by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau on February 11, 1935,
apparently alluded to the ESF’S first and only foreign exchange purchaae until
1936 -- 9terling amounting to $21,000: “When we saw that the external value of
the dollar was rapidly going out of control, we put the stabilization fund to
work on a moment’s notice, with the result that for the paat four weeks we
have successfully managed the value of the dollar in terms of foreign
currencies. The country can go about its business with assurance that we are
prepared to manage the external value of the dollar as long as it may be
necessary” (Treasury AR 1935, Exhibit 40, p. 235).
The decline in buying ratea for the pound from November 1934 through
March 1935 apparently led Morgenthau to believe that the British were
deliberately depreciating the pound. Why he concluded that he had
“successfully managed the value of the dollar” is not obvious since the pound
did not strengthen for six weeks following hia self-congratulatory statement.
Another example of Horgenthau’s readineaa to believe that exchange rate
movements were designed to be destabilizing when in fact they were routine
occurred in September 1936. The Rus9ians then offered to sell 1 million pounds
which the ESF bought on the Treaaury’a off-hand assumption that the sale wag
intended to drive down the pound, a result that ita purchage thwarted. That
very day the Treasury changed ita mind about the Russian motive (Paria 1938,
p. 31).
The secrecy of ESF operations was breached in June 1935, when the franc9
waa under attack and the president of the French central bank publicly thanked
Morgenthau for the ESF purchase of francs, much to Morgenthau’s embarrassment
(Paris 1938, p. 31).
Tripartite Agreement of 1936. In September 1936 the U.S., U.K., and French
governments simultaneously issued declarations accepting a devaluation of the
French franc and agreeing to use appropriate available resources to avoid
disturbance of international exchanges resulting from the readjustment. The
appropriate available resources were those of their exchange equalization
funds, the French having used more than half of the devaluation capital gain
to establish a newly created stabilization fund. The three governments agreed
to guarantee exchange rates for 24 hours at a time, authorities of the
stabilization funds announcing each morning the price at which they would
convert into gold at the end of the day on a reciprocal basis the foreign
currency balances the others had acquired. The U.S. , which had previously sold
gold at $35 an ounce, plus handling charges, only to gold-standard countries,
announced it would sell gold to stabilization funds. The arrangement
eliminated exchange risk for the authorities while preserving exchange-rate
flexibility. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were soon added to the
nations complying with the Tripartite Agreement and eligible to buy gold from
the United States.
By World War II the ESF had sold off modest amounts of sterling, francs,
and belgas it had acquired by participating in the Tripartite Agreement.
During the war the ESF held Swiss francs and balances in foreign currencies at
depositories abroad. It made the Swiss francs “available for governmental and
humanitarian purposes, ” according to the Treasury’s statement (Treasury AR
1945, p. 95).10
Post-Bretton Woods Change in ESF. As early as 1943 the Treasury Department
tentatively proposed the establishment of an international stabilization fund
poetwar to which all United Nations members would belong -- the original model
of the IMF, of which Harry Dexter White was the designer (Treasury AR 1943, p.
116; 1944, pp. 96-7; 1945, pp. 95-6).7
The U.S. Bretton Woods Agreement Act (PL 171-79) of July 31, 1945, made
a change with long-term effects on ESF operations. That change was the
provision in Sec. 7 that amended the Gold Reserve Act .S The amendment directed
the Secretary of the Treasury to use $1.8 billion of the ESF capital (shown on
the balance sheet as cash in the form of gold held by the Treasurer of the
United States) to pay part of the $2,750 million U.S. subscription to the IMF.
By June 1946, the United States had paid $275,000 of its subscription
(Treasury AR 1946, p. 83). It completed payment of its subscription on
February 26, 1947, in the form of 5687.5 million in gold, $280.5 million in
cash, the remaining $1,782 million in nonnegotiable noninterest-bearing notes,
payable on demand in dollars when needed by the IMF (Treasury AR 1947, p. 48).
From 1946 until 1961 the ESF held no foreign exchange of the
industrialized countries. A role for an exchange stabilization fund would seem
to have been obviated once the IMF was in place to manage exchange ratea, but
the ESF regarded the IMF as needing its support.
Balance-of-Payments Concerns. A deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments,
as measured by outflows of gold and dollars to countries in surplus, aroused
the concern of the Kennedy administration when it took office in January 1961.
The 10SS of gold to foreigners in that month was seen as an expression of a
lack of confidence in the administration’s commitment to a dollar convertible
into gold at a fixed price. The twin goals became to eliminate the balance-of-11
payments deficit and to check speculation against the dollar. To achieve the
second goal the Treasury wanted to be in the same position as other countries
that influenced the exchange value of their currencies. That required
reaourcee to buy and sell other currencies or, in official parlance, ealea and
purchaaes of dollars.
To that end the ESF began to
market. By June 1961 it had bought
operate directly in the foreign exchange
spot $25.4 million sterling, $20.1 million
D-marks, and $65 million Swiss francs to counter threats againgt the dollar.
In March 1961, after revaluations of the D-mark and the Dutch guilder,
the ESF made forward gales of D-marks to drive down the forward premium on the
mark (discount on the dollar). The Treasury’s forward mark commitments were
liquidated by early December; it used marks it had acquired in
a German debt repayment to the United States to settle in part
contracts that were maturing in the fall of 1961.




and Dutch guilders to bring down the premium on these currencies. A9 a
responge to the rise in the exchange value of the Italian lira in 1961 to its
upper limit against the dollar, the Treasury took over forward lire contracts
from the Italian foreign exchange office and drew on a $150 million line of
credit in lire it obtained by isguing three-month certificates of indebtedness
to support spot and forward operations in lire. As a result dollar
accumulating in Italy were lessened.
Even these limited operations strained the resources of the ESF. In June
1961 it had $200 million capital plus $136 million in net earnings accumulated
over its 27-year life. Average annual net earnings approximated $5 million,
from income on gold bullion sales, gold and exchange transactions, andinterest
exchange
12
on its government securities portfolio. To finance its foreign
purchases of roughly $100 million in 1961, the ESF had reduced its
account at the Federal Reserve Bank of
government securities.
The Treasury’s immediate aim waa
New York by $91 million and sold U.S.
to find ways to supplement ESF foreign ~
currency balances.9 It did ao first by persuading the G-10 countries to create
a facility that would expand the IMF’s ability to lend. The IHF held only
about $1.5 billion in currencies other than dollars. The new facility,
established in December 1961, was the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) ,
which provided the IMF with a $6 billion line of credit from central banks in
surplus to assist countries in deficit, in particular, the United
U.S. quota in the IMF was nearly $6 billion, so it could not draw
States. The
enough to
meet its reserve needs; the GAB was intended to serve as a supplementary
source of liquidity for the United Stateg. The IMF would sell to the United
States for dollars foreign convertible currencies borrowed from other
countries. These currencies would enable the United States to buy up dollars
offered in the market and to redeem dollars foreign central banks did not want
to hold, thus maintaining U.S. monetary gold reserves.
The Treasury
in exchange market
next persuaded the Federal Reserve
intervention. So
intervention operations.
The Federal Reserve as ESF Partner.
authorized open market transactions
begins the second
to serve as its partner
period of ESF
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
in foreign currencies for the account of
the Federal Reserve System on February 13, 1962. Before that date the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York served as the agent only of the ESF in executing its
limited foreign currency transactions. Since that date it has served both the13
ESF and the Federal Reserve System. In support of
intervention operations, the FOMC cited “the need
its decision to engage in
to supplement the relatively
small resources which the Treasury Stabilization Fund had available and had
been using to defend the dollar from speculative attack in the foreign
exchange markets since 1961” (Board AR 1962, p. 11).
Since this paper is a gtudy of the ESF, I ghall refer to the Federal
Re8erve’9 operations only in relation to the conduct of the ESF. The first
imperative for the Federal Reserve, once it determined that it had the legal
authority to intervene, was to acquire foreign currencies for itg future
operations. It did so by purchasing from the ESF in 1962 dollar equivalent of
$32 million in D-marks, and
Dutch guilders, and Italian
issued these currencies.
This initial Federal
of one-half million dollars each in Swiss francs,
lire to open accounts at the central banks that
Reserve purchase of currencies owned by the ESF
has been cited as the origin of “warehousing,” the euphemism that later came
into use to describe the provigion of funds to the ESF outside the
Congressional appropriation process (Todd 1992, pp. 132-33).10 It was not
until 1977, however, that warehousing of foreign currencies for the ESF was
formally authorized by the Federal
moment as one of the ways that ESF
Reserve. I shall digcuss warehousing in a
funds its currency acquisitions.
During the Bretton Wood9 period, except for forward purchaseg and zaleg
of foreign currencies, the ESF rarely participated in interventions, which
were for the most part financed by drawings on Federal Reserve zwap lines.ll
It was only beginning in 1978, after the formal authorization of warehousing
that the ESF jointly intervened with the Federal Reserve. The prearranged
share of the ESF varied from a little more than 10% of the foreign currency14
purchase or sale to half (more than half in the case of marks, since the ESF
had a swap line with the Bundesbank), and the Federal Reserve took the
remaining share. Shares tended to be equal during the limited interventions of
1981-85. Since 1987, shares have varied from equal percentages to three-
quarters for the ESF, one-quarter for the Federal Reserve. In addition to its
swap line with the Bundesbank, the ESF alBo had a line with the central bank
of the Netherlands, 1962-69.
The ESF as Principal. There are nuances in the relation of the ESF as
principal to its agent, the Federal Reserve. Paul Volcker emphasizes that the
Treasury does not have authority to instruct the Federal Reserve to spend its
own money on intervention and to take the attendant risks, and that the
Treasury would be reluctant to intervene over strong objections of the Federal
Reserve (Volcker and Gyohten, 1992, p. 234). The FOMC, at its March 27, 1990,
meeting, argued in favor of continuing to intervene, despite misgivings about
the effectiveness of intervention, as a means of moderating Treasury
initiatives (Transcript, 1990).
At the start in 1962 of Federal Reserve participation for its own
account, it was an eager agent, ready to support the principal and
enthusiastic about defending the dollar under the Bretton Woods system. Even
as disillusion with the results emerged when foreign currency balances
ballooned in the late 1980s, there was no consensus in the FOMC to end its
supporting role. It clearly did not want to challenge the Treasury’s role as
its superior.
Sources of ESF Funds. Since the ESF sought to expand its operations after
1961, despite limited resources, it developed a range of means to do so. The
Treasury in addition to the establishment of the GAB relied for the most part15
on other forma of borrowing that of course had to be repaid.




for dollars, payable over a 3- to 5-year period. These
turned over to the ESF occurred during 1964-66 ($1.6
2 billion), 1970-72 ($1.7 billion), and 1978 ($3 billion).
Warehousing by the Federal Reserve of ESF foreign currencies was
formally authorized on January 17, 1977, for up to $1.5 billion, increased in
1978 first to $1.75 and then to $5 billion, limited to 12 monthg, with no
limit on the term in 1980. The ceiling was raised to $10 billion in 1989, and
to $15 billion in 1990. The amounts held in the warehouse tended to rise with
the authorized amounts. In 1991 the ceiling was lowered to $10 billion and in
February 1992 to $5 billion. The ESF repurchased amounts in the warehouse in
1990-92 when it was emptied. The ceiling wag raised to $20 billion




Another source of ESF funds was the sale of Treasury securities




1978-79 as Carter bonds, in the former years to official
in half a dozen countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy,
and Switzerland) and the Bank of International Settlements, in
the later years to German and Swiss private investors. Net amounts issued in
different foreign currencies in the former period totaled $4.67 billion, $6.44
billion in the later period. By 1983 all issues had been redeemed, with
losses on Swiss francs in 1972-73, 1978-79, and 1981. The ESF’S
1972-73 were S165 million; in 1978-79, $1 billion; and in 1981,




resources waa the is~ue of Special Drawing Right9 (SDRS) by the IMF.
Allocations to the Treaaury in 1970-72 amounted to $2.29 billion, in 1977 to
$0.87 billion, and in 1980-81 to $1.73 billion. The Federal Re8erve monetized
SDRS for ESF use, crediting dollar amounts of the SDRS to ESF deposit balanceg
at the Federal Reserve, and these dollar mounts appear ag SDR assets on ESF
balance sheets. Table 1 below shows the importance of the SDR contribution to
the growth of ESF resources.
Record of Intervention. During the Bretton Woods era intervention was directed
to protect the value of dollars held by foreign central banks in order to
deter their exchange for U.S. gold. Rather than sell gold, the United States
borrowed foreign currencies to buy dollars held abroad. To repay the borrowed
foreign currencies, the proceeds of the sale of Treasury bonds denominated in
foreign currencies were used. As the decade of the 1960s progressed, the
authorities intervened massively in every major currency. The defense of the
dollar during the Bretton Woods period, however, failed, since the policies to
correct the U.S. balance of payments and dollar overvaluation were inadequate.
When the United States closed the gold window on August 15, 1971, it turned
from defense of the dollar valued in gold at $35 an ounce to dollar
devaluation.
With the demise of Bretton Woods and the coming of floating exchange
rates, the ESF and the Federal Reserve have nevertheless persisted in efforts
to manage exchange rates, despite the interval from 1981 to early 1985 when
intervention lost political favor. The record since then suggests that large
and reversible transitory movements of some exchange rates and widening of
bid-ask spreads may be temporarily reduced by intervention. There is no
indication, however, that, the frequent action of the U.S. authorities to17
quell disorderly marketa, haa had any permanent effect.
Whether the dollar is deemed strong or weak, intervention does not deal
with the fundamental economic conditions that underlie medium-term changes in
the exchange value of the dollar. The feared changes of medium-term variations
in the dollar’s exchange value have not materialized. The supposedly gro6aly
overvalued dollar in 1981-85 did not deindustrialize the U.S. economy and
usher in a service economy of low-income occupations. Similarly, concern that
a weak dollar would induce domestic inflation has not been substantiated. In
general, the costs of floating exchange rates should be compared to the costs
of the alternative, which is fixed or pegged exchange rates, vulnerable to
speculative attacks and bigger adjustments.
Why Warehousing? Two aspects of intervention merit comment. One is the
practice of warehousing by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. It seems to
contravene the statutory prohibition of the direct financing of the Treasury
by the Federal Reserve (Todd 1992, pp.140-41), The transcript of the FOMC’S
March 27, 1990, meeting reveals members’ doubts about the legality of
warehousing, despite the claim that the Federal Reserve General Counsel in
1962 had issued an opinion that justified warehousing as an open market
purchase of foreign exchange from
warehousing removed from Congress
the Treasury. The concern was that
the appropriation power, eliminating the
necessity for the Treasury to turn to Congress to obtain funds it did not have
to acquire foreign currencies. Nevertheless, at that meeting the FOMC
increased the limit on warehousing from $10 billion to $15 billion.’z
AS mentioned earlier, the ceiling in 1992 was reduced to $5 billion when
the ESF repurchased its foreign currencies in the warehouse. However, the role
of warehousing remains very much in question, since the FOMC raised the upper18
limit to $20 billion on January 31, 1995 (FRB May 1995, p. 447). The expansion
of the warehouse was intended to help the ESF participate in the Mexican
rescue program but, in the event, it has not availed itself of this provision.
Just as the courts have not tested the constitutionality of the ESF, there hag
been no test of the legality of warehousing.
Why Intervention? Empirical evidence offers no support for intervention
operations. No theoretical model is able to predict exchange rate movements at
short horizong, let alone explain exchange rate movements ex post. What
justifies the hubris of monetary authorities that they know the secret of the
foreign exchange market?
In a recent essay the president and senior vice president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond argue the case for separating the Federal Reserve
completely from foreign exchange operations on the ground that they imperil
the credibility of monetary policy (Broaddus and Goodfriend 1996). They do
not, however, recommend that the nation should forsake foreign exchange
operations. In my view, intervention has proved to be a pointless activity, so
I see no purpose in a continued role for either the Federal Reserve or the ESF
in this connection.
B, ESF as Lender
The ESF early on discovered a purpose for its existence other than
exchange market intervention -- stabilizing not the value of the dollar in
exchange for the currencies of the major industrialized countries, but lending
dollars to LDCS to stabilize their currencies, initially to compensate for the
damaging effects of the U.S. 1934 Silver Purchase Act. Before 1961 the only
foreign currencies in the post-World War II ESF portfolio were currencies of
LDCS with which it negotiated intermittent stabilization loan programs, a form19
of foreign aid.
What wa8 the geneaia of the idea of stabilization loans? The prototype
may have been the stabilization creditg extended to central banks during 1924-
31 to facilitate their return to the gold standard. Benjamin Strong and
Montagu Norman actively promoted the stabilization of the newly restored
European exchange rate structure post-World War I by means of credits from the
Federal Reserve and other central banks (Clarke 1967).
The selection of countries to which the ESF extended loans was obviously
a political decision made by the Treasury. Harry Dexter White’s memoranda,
written between 1936 and 1944, found among his unpublished papers, supporting
loans to various countries, attest to his influence on which ones the ESF
selected during this period. The countries included China, Mexico, other Latin
American countries, and Russia (Harry Dexter White Papers in the Seeley G.
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, box 1, items 3a, 3b; box 6,
items 14a, 14b, 14L, 19a; box 11, item 28a).
Stabilization Loans. Ten Latin American countries at one time or another
during the period 1936-61 had exchange stabilization agreements, often with
renewals. The countries in this group were
Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay
record of agreements, the initial ones mot.
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
and Peru. Mexico had the longest
vated by the disturbing effects of
the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of June 19, 1934, which led to a trebling of the
market price of silver between 1933 and 1935.
During World War II the mission of the ESF was expanded to include
provision of dollars to countries deemed worthy of such assistance for their
importance in the war effort. In Europe only Iceland had an exchange
stabilization agreement, but the ESF provided the USSR with dollars during20
World War II in exchange for gold. In Asia there were agreements with China
with respect to silver, gold, and yuan from 1936 to 1943. The ESF had wartime
agreements with India, Iran, and Egypt to sell gold in exchange for local
currencies for use by U.S. personnel stationed there. It provided Liberia with
U.S. currency when it converted its monetary system from British coins.
During the postwar years ESF stabilization loan programs were combined
with IMF standby arrangements, Export-Import Bank (EXIM bank) foreign currency
credits, and assistance from the International Cooperation Administration and
the Agency for International Development that was established in 1961. These
overlapping authorities represented different executive departments including
Commerce and State. The ESF contribution to these credit packages was small.
One advantage of combining the ESF loan with others was that the latter often
provided the LDC recipient with the means to repay the ESF.
In the period since 1962 stabilization agreements for the first time
provided for reciprocal swap facilities. Previously, when the ESF gave dollars
to LDC countries, a provision of the agreement required the country to
repurchase in dollars any of its currency that the ESF might have acquired.
Many of the same countries that had stabilization agreements with the ESF
before 1962 were again represented in the later period. There were also some
newcomers in Europe, Asia, and Africa, but Latin American countries
predominated. As was characteristic of the earlier Bretton Woods years, ESF
agreements were usually combined with loans from international or other U.S.
agencies.
Latin American countries with stabilization agreements during part or
all of the period included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico,21
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. European countries
Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Jamaica was the sole West
included Hungary,
Indies country, the
Philippine Republic the sole Asian country, Nigeria the sole African country
with a stabilization agreement.
An appendix, available on request from the author, presents the
published information in official sources about the stabilization and other
agreements the ESF signed with foreign countries before and after 1962. A
notable omission is any reference to the interest rate
were required to pay for dollar loans.
The country with the longest and most continuous




has noted: “Since 1976 [in fact, much earlier, as shown in the appendix], the
international financial community, led by the U.S. authorities, has come to
the financial assistance of Mexico on numerous occasions. The size and novelty
of these operations may have suggested to investors that Mexico was a
different, if not unique, sovereign borrower” (Truman 1996, p. 202) . In the
case of Mexico, since 1967, the Federal Reserve as well as the ESF have
duplicate short-term loan programs.
Examination of the list of countries that have been granted loans over
the years, as detailed in the appendix leads me to doubt that they have
resulted in stabilization. What evidence is there that repeated extensions of
loans helps these countries to advance their economies? The message of the
loan packages seems to be that mismanaged countries have a friend at the ESF,
which will arrange a rescue. Servicing and amortizing the loans seem to add to
the borrowers’ problems. Loans may be a fruitless policy for countries that
have yet to develop institutions that observe the eternal financial veritiesof
c.
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sound fiscal and monetary management.
Conspectus on ESF Asset Holdings
Aa the preceding discuaaion haa shown, the biography of the ESF fall~
into two perioda. That break is also reflected in its atatiatical profile
(Table 1). It began operationa in 1934 with $200 million. By 1960 it held S330
million in aaaeta, the
five intervening years
cumulative net income of $130 million over the twenty-
accounting for the increase. The slow growth was
indicative of the atrophy of a foreign exchange role for the ESF during its
initial quarter century and the rise of stabilization lending that it nurtured
to fill the void.
The principal noncash asset of the ESF in the first period was its gold
account, acquired for transaction with foreign monetary authorities and with
the market, as the statute authorized. The ESF continued to hold gold in a
special account of the Secretary of the Treasury at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York until December 9, 1974 (Treasury AR 1975, Exhibit 54, p. 501). The
Treasury on that date consolidated three different gold accounts, including
ESF gold, in its general account in anticipation of the gold auctiona it
conducted in 1975 and 1978-79. ESF gold was sold to the Treasury at its par
value. The gold category was then eliminated from ESF assets.
U.S. government securities and foreign exchange assets were minor
components of ESF noncash assets in the first period. Foreign exchange
included currencies of LDCS at par, not market, values, and minimal amounts of
currencies of industrialized countries.
It was in the second period, after 1960, that the main growth in ESF
aasets occurred. By 1995 ESF assets amounted to $42.6 billion. Of the increase
of $42.3 billion post-1960, the main contributors to faster growth of ESFa08ets were
addition of
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an increase of $29 billion in foreign exchange
the new asset of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
assets and the
amounting to $11.9
billion. Though listed as SDRS on the ESF balance sheet, they are ordinary




In addition to the $4.9 billion IMF allocation to the United States, the
acquired $2.6 billion SDRS from other IMF participants (IMF 1995, p. 53).
difference between the 1995 dollar value of SDRS and the dollar value of
initial acquisitions represents the net increase in SDR valuation in
dollar terms from parity in 1970 to $1.49 in 1995.
Accompanying growth of cumulative net income amounting to $26.6 billion
in the second period was an increase in foreign exchange asset
was a policy objective, presumably reflecting the influence of




Agreement of February 1987. The increases in foreign exchange assets was
concentrated in the period after the late 1980s. The assets encompassed major
country currencies as well as those of LDCS.
Holdings of U.S. government and foreign securities rose relative to
their representation in the portfolio in the earlier period, but at most
accounted for a third of total assets during the second period. Because ESF
investments in foreign securities were either combined with U.S. government
securities or foreign exchange or, if separately shown, assigned the label of
other securities, it is not possible to present them as a separate category.
D. Rate of Return on ESF Assets
Table 2 shows capital gains (
foreign exchange, minor before 1975,
annual, losses on foreign exchange,
osses) on gold before 1975 and amounts on
more substantial since. If the table were
totaling $1.7 billion, would be shown for24
1972-73, 1978-79, and 1981. These lo8aes were incurred, aa mentioned above,
when the liability for U.S. Treasury securities denominated in foreign
currencie~ was extinguished. Interest earnings on foreign exchange, and on
U.S. government and foreign securities are separate categories.
Finally, the table shows SDR valuation changes and interest earnings on
SDRS . The IMF currently uses a basket of five currencies for determining SDR
valuation. The same basket is also used to determine the interest rate on
SDRs . Before 1981 the basket included 16 currencies. The valuation is a
weighted average of the exchange rates of the five currencies.
The ESF posts a liability item of SDR certificates that it owes the
Federal Reserve for its SDR holdings, and a liability item of SDR allocations.
representing its obligation that would arise if the IMF were to cancel SDRS.
To date no cancellation has occurred. The sum of these liability items on June
30, 1995, was $15.7 billion. Deducting that amount from reported assets of
$42.6 billion establishes ESF net worth as no more than $26.9 billion on that
date.
Table 3 shows the rate of return of net income on total ESF assets,
1935-95, and of total return on individual assets, summing capital gains
(losses) and interest earnings of the asset categories. The data for the
separate asset categories are available only beginning 1940.
The rate of return on total ESF assets at the five-year intervals the
table presents, with three exceptions, varied between less than 1 and 4
percent. Exceptional years are 1945 when there was a windfall on gold
holdings, and 1990 and 1995, when foreign exchange, securities investments,
and SDRS all yielded 5-9 percent returns. I have not seen an explanation in
official sources of the gold windfall in 1945.25
Although there were loeses on foreign exchange and SDR revaluation in
the first quarter of 1990, for the year ending June 30, 1990, the results were
highly favorable. Similarly, foreign exchange losses and losses on SDR
revaluation were recorded in the last quarter of 1994, but for the year ending
June 30, 1995, the results were even more favorable than in 1990. In the
quarter ending September 30, 1995, the last one for which information has been
releaaed, the ESF sustained a $2 billion realized loss on its foreign exchange
portfolio and a $168 million loss for change in valuation of its SDR holdings.
Foreign exchange asseta in 1990 included besides marks and yen, small
amounts of sterling and Swiss francs, and an assortment of LDC currencies
(Mexican pesos, Hungarian forints, Guyana dollars, Honduran lempuraa). By 1995
the portfolio waa restricted to marka and yen and Mexican pesos. With a weak
dollar, the value of foreign currencies appreciated, and increases in SDR
aaseta accompanied increases in revaluations of the SDR against the dollar
between 1990 and 1995.
The ESF does not pursue positive rate of return results. Negative
results apparently are compatible with the missions it fulfills. It has not,
however, consistently lost money.
3. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE ESF
The ESF was originally established for a two-year period and
subsequently given repeated two-year extensions until it was made permanent.
It waa not exposed to scrutiny by either Congress or by Democratic and
Republican Administrations until the events of January 1995.
The belated attention paid to the ESF because of its role in the Mexican
bailout misses a broader measure of its influence. The true significance of
the ESF lies not in its domestic aspect -- a small agency in the U.S. Treasury26
Department, engaged in masterminding foreign exchange market intervention and
acting ae a benevolent lender to small troubled countries. What is more
noteworthy is the influence of ESF practice on the way the postwar
international monetary system, with the IMF at its center, has operated.
The ESF appears to be the prototype of the IMF. “The germ of the idea
of combining regulatory and financial provisions that is so prominent a
feature of the IMF” has been linked to the bilateral ESF agreement of November
1941 with Mexico. Like the ESF agreement, “the basic transactions of the IMF
to assist its member countries also involve exchanges of currency” (Gold 1988,
p. 1127). The IMF is said to have adopted the ESF form of exchanges of the
currencies of the two contracting parties and not loans by one party to the
other, to avoid the “indignity that might seem to attach to borrowing. ” This
may be IMF decorum, but no one believes that the exchange of pesos for dollars
is a transaction other than a loan of dollars.
The legacy of the ESF is that lending programs dominate the operation of
the IMF. Support for weak currencies that the IMF provides raises problems of
moral hazard. Whether IMF lending has good or bad consequences is a question
beyond the scope of this paper.’]Endnotes
1. Harry Dexter White (Treasury Director of Monetary Research, 1938-45;
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 1945-46) was appointed on December 15,
1941, to manage the operation of the ESF and to act as liaison between the
Treasury and the State Department on all matters having a bearing on foreign
relations (Treasury AR 1942, Order No. 43, 335). In an unpublished, undated,
memorandum on stabilization funds and international trade, he described
stabilization funds as “a convenient instrument to countries” to insulate
their economies from changes in “international balances, which immediately
reflect foreign disturbances and developments,” and, more important, to
influence day to day, week to week, and seasonal fluctuations of exchange
rates , “especially those arising from the operations of speculators, ” to
facilitate “the transition from one level of exchange rates to another, ” and
“within certain limits to set the level of exchange rates. . , The
determination and maintenance of the external value of its currency is the
main task of a Stabilization Fund” (see the Harry Dexter White Papers in the
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, box 2, item 6.e).
2. The suggestion that Congress might be requested to appropriate additional
funds to be used by the ESF, to my knowledge, was made on only one occasion.
On January 14, 1948, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on financing the European Recovery Program, Treasury Secretary John
W. Snyder proposed extending stabilization loans to European countries,
adding, “At the appropriate time, Congress may then be requested to
appropriate additional funds to be used by the United States Stabilization
Fund to make those loans” (Treasury A.R. 1948, p. 300).
3. Unlike the Federal Reseme, the ESF is not required to transfer any of its
earnings to the Treasury General Fund.4. One example of a use of the ESF other than for foreign exchange market
intenention or stabilization loans is that, before fiscal 1980, “the
administrative expenses for international programs, formerly funded by the
Exchange Stabilization Fund, became a separate international affairs
appropriation” (Treasury AR 1980, p. 105).
Until 1980 ESF annual and quarterly reports show gross income, expenses to
operate the ESF, and net income. Thereafter, only ESF net income has been
shown in its reports, as its expenses were shifted to the general government
budget.
5. In Britain lagged publication of EEA figures began in 1937. In June
1937, the Chancellor disclosed total holdings of gold in the EEA and Issue
Department on March 31, and subsequently made similar announcements every six
qonths (Sayers 1976, II, p. 490). Foreign exchange balances on March 31,
1937, were stated as “not more than a trifling amount. ” They were actually
about E7m.
6. Gold was held as an ESF asset only until 1975. See the discussion in
section 2C. below. Note, however, that at IMF gold auctions in 1977, the
Treasury purchased gold which it sold to the ESF (Treasury AR 1977, p. 158).
The official source does not explain why the ESF acquired this gold and how it
disposed of it. An entry for gold appears on the ESF balance sheet at the end
of the first three quarters of 1977 and not thereafter.
7. In 1941 Morgenthau instructed the Treasury staff to begin work on postwar
international monetary problems (Treasury AR 1945, Exhibit 51, p. 415). Harry
Dexter White was the author of the U.S. Treasury draft of the Bretton Woods
Agreement.
8. A second change made by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act was the creation by
Section 4(a) of a National Advisory Council “to coordinate the policies andoperations of the representatives of the United States on the Fund and the
Bank and of all agencies of the Government which make or participate in making
foreign loans or which engage in foreign financial, exchange or monetary
transactions .“ The Secretary of the Treasury was chairman of the Council, and
the Secretaries of State and Commerce, the Chairman of the Board of Governors
and of the Board of Trustees of the Export-Import Bank were members. The
agencies covered by the act were to inform the Council of their activities.
(As an aside, one may question the appropriateness of including the Chairman
of the Federal Reserve System in this roster of Executive Branch
representatives .)
According to the Council. “The International Monetary Fund was projected
to help achieve stability of exchange rates” (Treasury AR 1946, 302), hence
might have been expected to preempt the ESF role. In fact, the ESF role before
1962 was hardly diminished. Despite its exchange-rate implications, the Anglo-
American Loan Agreement dated December 6, 1945 (approved July 15, 1946, by
joint resolution of Congress), that authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
to make $3,750 million available as a line of credit to the United Kingdom,
did not involve the ESF, presumably because the size of the loan was clearly
in excess of the capacity of the ESF (Treasury AR 1947, 51).
In May 1976, however, the ESF had the capacity to lend the Bank of
England $1 billion. The Federal Reserve lent a like amount (Treasury AR 1976,
p. 86). Since the Federal Reserve had a $3 billion swap line with the Bank of
England, it could itself have provided the $2 billion. However, then Chairman
Arthur F. Burns insisted on ESF participation as the price for his agreement
with a Treasury plan to enforce British financial discipline (Burk.and
Cairncross 1992, p, 42).
9. ESF balances of foreign currencies are to be distinguished from foreigncurrency balances held in Treasury and in agency accounts that were acquired
without purchase with dollars,
10. Two official statements support this interpretation. In Section VI on
“Methods of Acquiring and Selling Foreign Currencies” (see the document,
“Authorization Regarding Open Market Transactions in Foreign Currencies”), the
FOMC included transactions with the ESF. In Section 4, “Transactions in
Forward Exchange” (see the document, “Guidelines for System Foreign Currency
Operations”) , referred to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where
authorized, taking over from the ESF “outstanding contracts for forward sales
or purchases of authorized currencies” (Board AR, 1962, pp. 59, 63) .
11. These were lines of credit the Federal Reserve established with the
central banks of the leading European countries providing for the right of the
U.S. to draw on a foreign currency up to a specified ceiling for a specified
term, and the reciprocal right of the foreign central bank to draw on U.S.
dollars at the current exchange rate for a matching sum and term.
12. Chairman Greenspan was eloquent in 1991 in opposing the Treasury’s
proposal that would authorize the Federal Reserve Banks to lend up to $25
billion to the FDIC to absorb losses sustained by the Bank Insurance Fund in
resolving failed banks. He stated: “Not only would use of the Resene Banks
for funding the BIF serve no economic purpose, it could create potential
problems of precedent and perception of the Federal Resene. In particular,
the proposal involves the Federal Reserve directly funding the government, The
Congress has always severely limited and, more recently, has forbidden the
direct placement of Treasury debt with the Federal Reserve, apparently out of
concern that such a practice could compromise the independent conduct of
monetary policy and would allow the Treasury to escape the discipline of
selling its debt directly to the market. . . . In addition, if implementationof the proposal created a precedent for further loans to the BIF or to other
entities, the liquidity of the Federal Resene’s portfolio could be reduced
sufficiently to create concerns about the ability of the Federal Resene to
control the supply of resemes and, thereby, to achieve its monetary policy
objectives” (FRB June 1991, pp. 435-36).
Chairman Greenspan has not been equally opposed to Federal Reserve loans
to the ESF. In what respect does warehousing differ from lending to the BIF?
13. To balance the suggestion made here of a greater ESF influence than is
commonly assigned to it, let me note an erroneous attribution of greater ESF
influence than it actually had. A recent paper asserts that the ESF played a
domestic monetary role in the control of excess reserves in 1936-37 (Calomiris
and Wheelock 1996). Inactive gold was held in the Treasury’s General Fund,
not the ESF.32
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Principal Noncash &sets of the ESF
at Five-Year Intervals, 1935-95
Principal Noncash Assets
End Us. Gold Special
of Government Foreign Drawing
June Tot~ &sets a and Foreign Exchange Rights
Securities ,
($ i~l!ions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1934 200,0 38.2 0 50.6* o
1935 205.8 26.8 0.02 0 0
1940 244.4 10.4 19.12 86.0 0
1945 290.4 ~(),~ 24,09 b 80.0 0
1950 301.5 ~oo 27.60 99,9 0
1955 314.7 25,0 0 52.2 0
1960 320,2 60,0 25.00 c 40.4 0
1965 517,4 317.6 80.67
1970 2,560.8 45.2 409.29
1975 4,038.8 1,451.4 0,27
1980 11,254.0 4,036.1 3,251.71
1985 12,378.1 3,232.3 3,228.48
1990 26,346.9 1,021,0 13,060.12








a) Excludes $1.8 billion in gold account at Treasurer of U.S. 1934-45, used in
1947 to pay for part of U.S. subscription to lMF.
b) Includes $5 million due from Government of Cuba.
c) Due horn kgenti.ne central bank.
d) Lncludes$30 tilion in silver.
e) Includes Mexican pesos valued at $9 billion, and foreign securities.
Source: Cois, 1-5, Treasure Bulletin; ~ Treasury, 1940, p,789, for 1934-35.Table 2
Capital Gains @sses) and hterest Earnings on ~F Assets
at Five-Year htervals, 1940-95
($ Millions)
Capital Gains (Losses) Interest Earnings on
on Change in U.S. Government Foreign
<= Ending Foreign SDR and Foreign Exchange
June 30 Gold Exchange Valuation SDRS Securities Balanms
1940 3.8 0.40 0.2 0.3
1945 26.9 0.5
1950 2.6 0.;0 0.5 0;
1955 1.1 a 0.6
1960 2.3 a 3.0 0:
1965 a 19.8 4.4
1970 (2:::) 0.1 0.5 56.6
1975 (0:0) 32.8 (65 .7) 162.1 (0.2)
1980 271.20 (39.8)(104.1) 553.2 11.4
1985 (125.90) (9.7) 75.5 244.3 165.4
1990 1020,20 ~ozm 9 30g<g 73.9 826.0
1995 2963.60 295.5 153.8 313.8 799,6
aLess than one hundred thousand